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Special Book Review
L'AFFAIRE SABBATINO: A WISTFUL REVIEW*
By

BuRNs H. WEsToN**
'"Well, sir,' said Mr. Dooley, 'I jus' got hold iv a book, Hinnissy, that
suits me up to th' handle, a gran' book, th' grandest iver seen. Ye know
I'm not much throubled be lithrachoor, havin' manny worries iv me own,
but I'm not prejudiced again' books. I am not. Whin a rale good book
comes along I'm as quick as anny wan to say it is't so bad, an this here
book is fine. I tell ye 'tis fine." '1
"How's that now?" Mr. Hinnissy might have queried. "Th' grrandest, ye say?"
"Well sir, maybe not th' grandest," Mr. Dooley might have allowed.

"But be in large, Hinnissy, Mooney an me we agree. An' that makes it
fine. I tell ye, that makes it fine."

Professor Mooney, no mean champion of Finley Peter Dunne and
Dooleyisms himself, has written a splendid little book. Not superexcellent, but splendid all the same. Assiduously and persuasively, he
argues that the Act of State Doctrine-one of a number of legalisms by
which domestic tribunals have both honored and dishonored the extraterritorial impact of foreign wealth seizures over the years--"when
pushed beyond its proper purpose, becomes heretical and is utterly
without justification in light of the realities of the past practice of our
nation 2 and "tends to disrupt the basic purpose of the international
legal system."3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino4 exemplifies this,
he rightly complains, in three principal ways: its application of the
Doctrine "is indefensible in the light of its origin, the history of its
past application, and the pressing current requirements of our international economy." 5 In the end, he unmasks both the Doctrine's classic
expression and its Sabbatino perversion for what they really are:
respectively, (1) "the theory that strict territoriality authorizes every
state in applying its own power to ignore everybody's law,"6 and (2)
"the idea that the courts of one nation must defer to foreign govern0
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A review of FOREIGN SEIZUREs: SABBATINO AND TH AcT OF STATE DocTnmE.
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1 DuNNE, MR. DOOLEY AT His BEsT 99 (Ellis ed. 1943).
2 MooNY 5.

3 Id. at 154.
4376 U.S. 398 (1964).
5 MooNEY 6.
Old. at 155.
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7
mental acts which wreck or undermine the international economy."

RECAPrruLATiON

Chapter 1 begins at the historical beginning: in 1674 with Blad v.
Bamfield,s to which the Act of State Doctrine owes its judicial genesis;
in 1848 with Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover,9 from which it
draws its present "heraldric" and "rather pretentious" expression; and
in the early nineteenth century with Rose v. Himley (1808),11 Hudson
v. Guestier (1808)," and The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden
(1812),12 in which its American debut was first foreshadowed. But
not-or at least not mainly-to satisfy some personal aesthetic about
proper historical exposition. The author's purpose is otherwise and
twofold: first, to remind us that the Doctrine, which finally emerged
full bloom under the pervasive influence of "analytical positivism,"
was formulated "as a natural outgrowth of the international law
theories of the 'nationalist' writers" 3z of the 16th and 17th Centuries,
most notably the territoriality-comity theories of Ulrich Huber; and
second, to support his first claim (later substantiated) that with unwarranted Austinian enthusiasm the Sabbatino majority veered sharply
from the Doctrine's originally and historically charted discretionary
course-that is to say, if I may, from the Act of State Doctrine "properly so called."
In Chapters 2 and 3, Professor Mooney develops near exhaustively
the second of his three-pronged indictment. In so doing, he demonstrates anew the central importance of examining "precedent" in contextual and policy-oriented terms. Reviewing first the "South American" and then the European seizure (and other) cases which have
come before American courts over the last hundred years or so,14 he
properly concludes that, except for the "big anomaly" of the Nazi
seizures cases, the Act of State Doctrine has always been applied (in
all its variations) consistently with the popular-and only slightly less
7 Ibid. The italics are Professor Mooney's and are intended to stress the fact
that the Sabbatino Court erroneously equated the Act of State Doctrine with a
doctrine of compulsory judicial abstention in cases involving, to quote the Court,
"a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government.
The author may be criticized, however, for not making the compulsory import of
this holding sufficiently explicit throughout his discussion.
886 Eng. Rep. 992.
9 2 H.L.C. 1.
10 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 267.
11 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293.
12 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116.
13 MOONEY 10.
14 In view of the

fact that many of Professor Mooney's "South American"
cases concerned seizures undertaken in what I would call "Middle America" (e.g.,
Meico, Costa Rica, Haiti, etc.) the term "Latin American" would have been
more appropriate.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 55,

often, the official-foreign policy perspectives of this nation:' 5 in the
Latin American cases, first to foster New World independence (in
keeping with the once pretentious Monroe Doctrine) and then to
satisfy both the "interventionist" and "non-interventionist" policies of
a later era; and in the European cases, generally to validate our

national rancor (hysteria?) toward Red regimes of all hues, judicial
disgust for Nazi policies having been shockingly late in coming (and
then only by explicit Executive encouragement via the famous
"Bernstein letter"). Professor Mooney's point is, of course, that before
Sabbatino the Doctrine was employed only exceptionally in any rigid
or unrealistic sense. Foreign policy flexibility has traditionally and
preeminently been its hallmark.
With all this in mind, the author then tackles FAffaire Sabbatino
itself,16 leaving his final basic complaint to later development and substantiation. The progression, he hints, is natural because Sabbatino
"incorporated all three now-familiar stress factors" by which, presumably, the bulk of past Act of State cases might be categorized:

"1) a 'Communist' seizure, 2) by a South American government, 3) in
which the State Department manifested disapproval of judicial inquiry into the merits."17 But as Professor Mooney is quick to point out,
historical similarities can be deceiving. For until Sabbatino "no case m
the Supreme Court [or any other American court] clearly presented an
instance of a foreign seizure [alleged to be] in violation of international law."' 8 In other words, Sabbatino was unprecedented in a
major and critical particular.
It is essentially this fact which underlies the author's enlightened,
though not altogether ordered, call for a different result. For whatever
15 It deserves mention at this juncture that the author is concerned throughout
principally with American Act of State Cases. The "international pattern" of Act
of State cases is summarized in the authors "Appendix I' at 165-77, and to
similar effect.
16 Moo=Y, chs. 4 and 5.
17 Id. at 72. This allegation is not wholly accurate, however. Never before
Sabbatino was there an Act of State case "in which the State Department manifested disapproval of judicial inquiry into the merits." What Professor Mooney has
in mind is the State Department's explicit interposition following the first of the
well-known Bernstein cases. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaanshe
Stoomvaart-Maattschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). But this was an expression of approval-not disapproval-of substantive judicial inquiry. What Professor
Mooney no doubt means to say, therefore, is that an expression only of Executive
concern was a familar "stress factor."
18 Moo=Ey 76. I have inserted the phrase "alleged to be" for tvo reasons.
First, because it is likely that this is what Professor Mooney intended. Second, because the statement is otherwise subject to double criticism. Without the insertion, the statement would deny that any of the foreign seizures in issue before
Sabbatino were violative of international law in fact-a debatable proposition, for
(Continued on next page)
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can be claimed to rationalize Sabbatino's 'legalistic" and "parochial"
break from the flexible past uses of the Act of State Doctrine-it is
axiomatic, after all, that "precedent" alone is not and should not be
controlling always-it must be said (if it can be at all) so as to justify
beyond peradventure that a traditionally discretionary "rule" of judicial
abnegation (which, in Mr. Justice Harlan's own words, is "compelled
by neither international law nor the Constitution") is entitled to overcome the time-tested principle that the "law of Nations" is a part of
the "law of the land" which American courts, in the absence of Congressional enactments to the contrary, are constitutionally bound to
administer. In this regard, Professor Mooney rightly contends, and notwithstanding the majority's commendable wish "to preclude the possible application of narrow, parochial views by the American judiciary
in matters having to do with foreign relations," 19 Sabbatino failed
to pass muster. Briefly, the Court's argument ran as follows: 1)
the Act of State Doctrine, while not constitutionally required, has
"constitutional underpinnings" in the system of the separation of
powers; 20 2) as such, it sometimes requires the Judiciary to defer to
the Executive in order to maintain "the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affair;' 8) this deferrence is
necessary when the area of international law in question lacks "codification or consensus" and/or when the particular matter at bar involves politically sensitive questions; 22 4) "[t]here are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so
divided as the limitations on a State's power to expropriate the property of aliens'" 3 or "which touches more sensitively the practical and
ideological goals of the various members of the community of na(Footnote continued from preceding page)

example, in the case of the anti-semitic Nazi seizures. The author's use of the

word "clearly" may be mitigating, however. Also, the statement would flatly pro-

claim that the Cuban seizure involved in Sabbatino was internationally uinauthorized. Again, there is room for debate. In this latter connection, see text at
notes 60-63, infra.
19 MooNEY 94.
20 376 U.S. at 423.
21 Id. at 427-28.
22Id. at 428.

23 Ibid. One of the references cited by the Court to support this conclusion is
an article co-authored by this reviewer: Dawson and Weston, "Prompt, Adequate
and Effective": A Universal Standard of Compensation? 30 FoiHAui L. BEv. 727
(1962). This would not be worth noting but for the fact that the article does not
fully support the Court's assertion, a point which was picked up by Mr. Justice
White in his dissent at 376 U.S. 465 n.22.- In the full context of the Court's
argument, the article seems to have been cited for the view that the principle of
compensation as such is subject to great division of opinion. The article makes no
such claim, however. It asserts only that the measure of compensation is open to
debate. This, to quote Mr. Justice White, is a more "discrete issue."
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tions"; 2 4 5) the "balance of relevant considerations" therefore dictates
that the Act of State Doctrine must be applied to "a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign, extant and recognized
by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if
the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international
law."25 In other words, the Judiciary is under a compulsory nonconstitutional duty to ignore its constitutional obligations (a) whenever international law does come to it, to use the author's semihyperbole, "full grown, clear-cut, well settled and fully accepted by
all other nations of the globe,"26 or (b) whenever the foreign seizure
question at bar is political in nature. "A narrower and more outdated
view of the judicial process in general and the processes of international law in particular," Professor Mooney laments, "cannot be
27
imagined than that projected by the Court."
His critique of "(a)," above, is damning. Not only is the rulinghere quoting from Mr. Justice White's dissent-"'tantamount to a
declaration excusing this Court from any future consequential role
in the clarification and application of international law,"28 but it
leaves "mercilessly vague" just "[p]recisely how a global consensus
on the international law of expropriations, or any other point for that
matter, will come into existence without the rational process of decision-making by responsible national agencies .... ".2
[I]t is a reasonable inference from the majority opinion that the mystic
processes of international diplomacy are thought to be the only legitimate
source of "international law," properly so called. Even the authoritative

writings of lifelong international law scholars is downgraded and ignored

in the majority opinion. It is as plain as the positivist nose on the face of
the Court's opinion that the United States Supreme Court doubts both
the existence and utility of international law for deciding other than

rubberstamp cases.30

Detailing at some length the implications this bears for the existing
horizontalism and future pattern of international claims settlements
(with a few passing sallies against Professor Richard A. Falk, Sabbatino'sprincipal defender or sponsor, as you will), he concludes:
24 Id.at 430.
Id.at 428.
26 MooNy 94.
27 Ibid.
28 376 U.S. at 458, quoted in MooNEY 94.
29
MooN-Y 94.
25

oId.at 94-95.
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The most questionable aspect of this whole approach is that it magnifies the existing diversity of international opinion concerning
economic
3
legislation and makes it an obstacle impossible to cross. 1

Professor Mooney could also have noted that a "lack of consensus"
over given legal questions, far from being a cause for judicial
abstention, is among the best reasons for active judicial participation.
The author's censure of "(b)," above, is somewhat less trenchant.
Noting that the Court "seems to state that the Act of State Doctrine
... is closely related to the 'political question' problem of constitutional

law,"32 he adopts Mr. Justice White's analysis as his own:
Without doubt political matters in the realm of foreign affairs are
within the exclusive domain of the executive branch.... But this is far
from saying that the Constitution vests in the executive exclusive absolute
control of foreign affairs or that the validity of a foreign act of state is
necessarily a political question.... And it cannot be contended that the
Constitution allocates this area to the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive, for the judicial power is expressly extended by that document to
controversies between aliens and citizens or states, aliens and aliens,
and foreign states and American citizens or states.a3

His parting riposte lays especially bare the Court's vulnerability:
Assuming that the Sabbatino decision is grounded to some extent on
the Constitution, either because it represents a particular application of

the "political question" rule which may be of Constitutional origin or
because the majority invoked the tripartite structure of our federal
government (set up in the Constitution) for a particular ruling based on
the "separation of powers" theme, then fascinating questions of Constitutional magnitude should arise if the Executive tries to exercise its Bernstein exception or when Congress undertakes to legislate on the subject.
It is just a matter of time until the former case arises, and the latter event
has already occurred. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the 4Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 purports to change the Sabbatinorule.a

The remaining discussion is devoted to an examination of the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper Amendment in the legislative-judicial
31 Id. at 127.
32Id. at 104.
z3 376 U.S. at 461-62, quoted in MooNEY 104.
24 MOONEy 105-06. The Hickenlooper Amendment referred to by Professor
Mooney (and hereinafter by this reviewer) is an amendment to Section 301(c) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. See Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat.

1013. The effect of the amendment was to reverse the Sabbatino decision by ,prohibiting American courts from applying the "federal act of state doctrine in
cases involving "a confiscation or other taking" by a foreign State "in violation of
the principles of international law" unless the Executive Branch affrmatively
"determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required . . . by the
foreign policy interests of the United States." This same section was inserted by
Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. See Pub. L. No. 89-171, § 301(d)
(2), 97 Stat. 653. The effect of this latter legislation was to make the amendment
permanent.
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"separation of powers" context, its history, its purpose, and its recent

and thus far sole judicial interpretation. 35 Lest Professor Mooney's
basic point be missed, however, his final remark is worthy of note:
The composition of the Supreme Court being substantially the same
as it was in 1964 and assuming that Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion still
farily represents the thinking of a majority of the justices of the Court,
will the Court stick by its Doctrinaire Act of State rule announced in
Sabbatino, acquiesce in the Hickenlooper Amendment, avoid the question altogether, or-perhaps-split the baby?
The significance of these speculations into the Court's future maneuverings lies in the distinct possibility that if the Sabbatino ruling is truly
based on "constitutional underpinnings" then the Hickenlooper Amendment may be tantamount to another attempt by Congress to alter the
constitutional allocation of judicial duties,
which under Marbury v.
Madison cannot constitutionally be done.3 6

In Chapter 6, Professor Mooney lays the foundation for his third
and final basic claim-carefully explained in his "Coda," followingthat the Supreme Court misunderstood and/or disregarded the pressing demands of our contemporary world economy and, so, because of
the interdependences of the entire world social process, of the
international legal order itself. United States post-World War II
foreign policy, he observes, has moved increasingly, though not unfalteringly, "to help build stable, peaceable, and economically sturdy
nations, 37 as perhaps best recently exemplified by the Alianza
para Progresso. Crucial to this foreign policy, he continues, is
the American private investor, party because of the efficiency with
which he can contribute organization and skills (as well as capital) and partly, I would add, because there simply are not (for political and other reasons) sufficient public funds to go around. The
underlying theory, not always borne out by past practices, is that
widespread private enterprise helps to separate economic power from
political and other forms of power and, so, is the keystone to the
development of democratic societies. In any event, vhat concerns
Professor Mooney (and what he says should have concerned the
Sabbatino Court) is that American private entrepreneurs are today
being deterred from investing in precisely those economies which need
them the most-at least from the economist's point of view. The
35 e MooqmY 106-24. The -sole judicial'interpretation" may be found in
Banco Naconal de Cuba v. Farr v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguej de
Cuba,
3 243 F. Supp. 957 (1965).
6 Moo :y 123-24.
37 Id. at 136.
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reason? increasing foreign wealth seizures in the laggardly developing

underdeveloped world. Illustrative, he recounts, is an A.B.A. committee report which notes that an erstwhile president of the Interna-

tional Finance Corporation "'places $500 million of private capital
as a conservative estimate of the funds held back from Latin Ameri38
One may
can investment as a result of the Cuban nationalizations."'
legitimately ask, of course, what these difficulties for American foreign
policy in general and American private investors in particular have to
do with the welfare of the world economy as a whole. For the doubt-

ing Thomases who might wrongly conclude that the author is moved

more by provincial than worldly biases,39 Professor Mooney has a
disarming and rather discomforting answer:
As the United States goes, so goes the world in this matter of private
foreign investment. During the period 1946 through 1958 the United
States' share of the net outflow of capital on an international scale
amounted to two-thirds of the total. Direct investments constituted about
90 percent of the total American private long-term investment abroad,
and thus a significant change in the amount or direction of American
direct investment by private investors registers traumatically on the entire international pattern of investment outflow... Economic development of the international community at this point in history depends
largely on the quality and direction of the international flow of capital
from investor to borrower nations.... American investors should be encouraged to run risks of nationalization of their foreign investments...
if for no other reason than that distortion of economic development
trouble for the entire world for decades-perhaps cenmerely breeds 40
turies-to come.
38 REP. BY THE CoImmr. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INvESTmENT, SECTION

OF INTERNATIONAL AND CoinrpInTn LAw, A.B.A., THE PROTECTION or PRIVATE
PROPERTY INvEsrED ABROAD 5 n.13 (1963), quoted in MOONEY at 144 n.12.

39The Sabbatino majority may properly be included in this group. For
example, central to its reasoning was its reluctance to engage in what it called "the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest
or with international justice." 376 U.S. at 428. Implicit in this is the common but
erroneous assumption that there exists some necessarily irreconcilable dichotomy
between "national" and "international" interests. See, e.g., F~nnuNN, THE
CHANGING STRucruE or INTERNATIONAL LAw 45-59 (1964). The difficulty
with this view is that it lacks consistent empirical reference and so confuses the
observational standpoint from which international law can be meaningfully understood and channeled. International law is predicated on the existence not of
"national" and "international" interests, but on "special" and "common" interests,
the latter of which may include both exclusive and inclusive interests. Thus, it may
be entirely consistent with what the majority calls "international justice" (i.e., the
long-range common interest of the world community) that a particular legitimate
exclusive interest of one community member be given preference over a particular
inclusive interest of all community members, a possibility which of course requires the most delicate and enlightened balancing on the part of the decisionmakers involved. It is a shortcoming of Professor Mooney's book that it does not
touch4 0upon this question more than obliquely.
MooNmy 152.
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In other words, "[t]he United States private investor is the mainspring of this entire global process." 41
In these lights it is easy to see why Professor Mooney so deeply
regrets the Sabbatino decision. It is not simply that it failed to serve
the current and long-range interests of the United States or its
nationals. "The most important economic stake in the Sabbatino
case," he emphasizes, "was not the $175,000 [therein claimed] "42
The larger issue may turn out to have been the fate of the long-range
economic development program of the international community which
now consists largely of the existing $66 billion in American foreign investments
and the annual outflow of some $4 billion from American in43
vestors.

For Professor Mooney, in other words, it was less the Court's misconstruction of the Act of State Doctrine (as traditionally invoked
and applied) than its failure to appreciate the global interests at
stake-and so its perpetuation of the widespread Austinian misconception that economic, political, and social considerations are not
"legal' considerations-that causes him the greatest grief.
There is no cogent reason [why] American municipal courts should
be foreclosed from the international judicial process of clarifying the basic
international community policies concerning economic activity. On the
contrary, there is every reason in favor of their participation. . . . Pressing national and international policies dictated that the Doctrine should
be restated pragmatically so as to conform to past realities, satisfy present
demands, and be applicable to future problems. The obvious step was
to except from the sweeping prohibition of the dogmatic version foreign
seizures alleged to be in violation of international law and permit rational
judicial inquiry to determine legality. Permitting our domestic courts
access to an arena already occupied by the domestic courts of other
nations can be regarded as catastrophic only by those whose concept of
international law must 44now be refrained to incorporate what was previously an unthinkable.

The Hickenlooper Amendment, he resolves, is the saving grace.
With all its faults, ambiguities and limitations ...
although somewhat timid. .

. ,

[it] is an acceptable,

policy declaration by the Congress to the

Judiciary that to the extent of its jurisdiction the courts should lend whatever support they can muster to the larger task of implementing international
economic development through an emerging international legal
order. 45
41 Id. at 155.
42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.
44 Id. at 157-58.
45Id. at 156-57.
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So much for Professor Mooney's praiseworthy argument. It remains now to consider what prevents his study from being superexcellent. The questionability of its title, 4 6 the inelegance of some of
its organization and syntax, the lack of sufficient footnote references
-these and other minor imperfections (some of which have already
been mentioned) could be belabored. But it is not so much these minor
sins, regrettably, as those of a more significant character which prevent Professor Mooney from reaching truly Olympian heights. To
these sins-more of omission than commission-we may now turn.
First and perhaps foremost is the author's failure to take more than
a passing shot at Sabbatino's jurisprudential substructure: Nineteenth Century legal positivism. Salutary in all respects would have
been no less than a wholesale assault upon this doctrinal base, if only
to have made more meaningful the author's primary discontent-that
the Court failed to think in policy-relevant terms. For Professor
Mooney, strongly influenced by the progressive policy-oriented jurisprudence of Professors McDougal and Lasswell of the Yale Law
School, no doubt this would have come swiftly. Consider, for example,
the statement on which hangs the Court's precise holding of compulsory abstention:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
not inconsistent with the national interest or with international
principle
47
justice.

Here is Nineteenth Century legal positivism in a nutshell: answers
to legal questions can be arrived at only by deductively applying the
facts to pre-existing rules as to which there is overwhelming, if not
absolute, consensus; rules of international law-if they are truly to
represent law "properly so called" and so be binding, or "imperative"are principally to be found in the explicit and "unambiguous" agreements of sovereign states; the courts, concerned with the law as it is,
are barred from considering what the law ought to be and why-a
"legislative function"; and so forth. A more disappointing theoretical
46 The book is not about "FoRE GN Smzu,.s," the primary title, but about
"SABBATWO AND THE Acr oF STATE DocmnE," the secondary or auxiliary title.

Unless the auxiliary title is included in all indexes and references, one will be misled to assume that the book treats of the substantive issues bearing upon foreign
seizures. The objection is minor, to be sure.
47 376 U.S. at 428.
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posture for the highest court of one of the most legally and psychologically sophisticated societies of all time can scarcely be imagined. The
hard truth is that it is fundamentally rn-premised. Among other things,
it places undue reliance upon what formal logic can realistically
achieve with the kind of material with which jurists are accustomed to
deal in resolving conflict. It all but repudiates the basal significance
that customary legal prescription has had for the development of international law. And it mistakenly assumes that law cannot be defined in
terms of morality and/or policy considerations. In sum, it describes a
non-existent decision process. It is no exaggeration to say that its
effect can be corrosive in the extreme, and would have been after Sabbatino were it not for the partially redeeming Hickenlooper Amendment. Mr. Justice Harlan unwittingly pinpointed its effect himself:
When one considers the variety of means possessed by this country to
make secure foreign investment, persuasive or coercive effect of judicial
invalidation of acts of expropriation dwindles in comparison. The newly
independent states are in need of continuing foreign investment ...
Foreign aid given to many of these countries provides a powerful lever
in the hands of the political branches to ensure fair treatment of United
States nationals. Ultimately the sanctions of economic embargo and the
freezing of assets in this country may be employed. Any country willing to
brave any or all of these consequences is unlikely to be deterred by
sporadic8 judicial decisions directly affecting only property brought to our
4
shores.

In other words, it promotes a world ruled more by the brute force
naked power than by the autoritative processes of rational persuasion.
No exponent of "neo-realism" himself, it would have behooved Professor Mooney to have probed more deeply the perniciousness of Sabbatino's Austinian foundations and, coextensively, to have tendered a
comprehensive description of how the international decision process
does in fact operate, albeit imperfectly, as a constructive shaping
force in the transnational affairs of man.
Second and jurisprudentially related is the author's apparent reluctance to reply in detail to Professor Richard A. Falk, Sabbatino's
principal defender. This is not to say that Professor Mooney provides
no answers whatsoever. Quite to the contrary, he delivers a laudable
overall rebuke. A specific blow for blow repudiation of the Falk thesis,
however, would have proved extremely valuable, if only because the
Sabbatino majority relied heavily upon Professor Falk's assessment of
"the role of domestic courts in the international legal order."49 The
48 Id. at 435-36.

49 See Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participationof Domestic Courts in the
InternationalLegal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
(Continued on next page)
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basic Falk thesis, premised on the commendable conviction that in
this thermonuclear age domestic courts should help to ease global
tensions by fostering "minimum trust" in international relations, and
substantially quoted by Professor Mooney, is briefly restated:
[I]n general, municipal courts should avoid interference in the domestic
affairs of other states when the subject matter of disputes illustrates a
legitimate diversity of values on the part of two national societies. In
contrast, if the diversity can be said to be illegitimate, as when it exhibits an abuse of universal human rights, then domestic courts fulfill
their role by refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal system.
In instances of illegitimate diversity, where a genuine universal sentiment
exists, then the domestic courts properly act as agents of international
order only if they give maximum effect to such universality.
It is postulated here that the existence of capitalist and socialist
national societies is an instance of legitimate diversity in the world community. Domestic courts . . . should approach any legal controversy
emerging out of this diversity with tolerance and respect, developing
principles of self-restraint and justifying interferences with foreign
economic policy by reference to variables such as extraterritoriality rather
than to differences implicit in the two societies. . . . The location of
domestic courts within the national system makes it desirable to curtail
their consideration of the hostile substantive policy of another unit in
areas of legitimate diversity. In order to guard against provincialism,
domestic courts should be deprived of competence over such a case by
the use of quasi-jurisdictional doctrines like act of state.... Many lawyers allege that it is a progressive tendency to encourage substantive review by domestic courts because this tends to increase the application of international norms.... The difficulty with this plausible position
is that it overlooks the confusion of substantive norms in the economic
area that exists as a result of the widespread emergence of socialism.
Domestic courts are not equipped emotionally or technically to cope
with this confusion, 50and tend to invoke norms that correspond with the
national preference.

A variation on this theme is also substantially noted by Professor
Mooney:
An insistence upon consensus as a basis of obligation in international
law takes account of the structure of international society. There are no
developed central legal organs able to change old law that conflicts with
new patterns of values. Therefore, law must be administered in accord
with the national governmental structure that persists. The dispersion of
governmental institutions on the national level and the patterns of effective control both afArm the territorial nature of law. In the absence of
an overwhelming consensus to the contrary, domestic courts should accept
the validity of the territorial acts of the foreign government. . . [A]
restrictive view of the judicial function acknowledges the weakness of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

16 RTrrGEs L. REv. 1 (1961) on which the majority relied heavily. Professor Falk
later expanded this article into a book: FALX, TE RoLE oF Dom-srsc CouRTs iN
TE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964).
5OFLx, op. cit. supra note 49, at 72-75, quoted in part in MooNEY at 125
n.45.
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substantive international law in a world divided along ideological, cultural
and economic lines. 51

As Professor Mooney says, "[o]ne has the distinct impression Mr.
Justice Harlan said just that in his Sabbatino opinion."52 He then pro-

poses to authenticate, though all too casually, the falsity of the "no
consensus" argument when addressed to "the basic international
norm" that "a taking must be compensated" and, thereafter, to demonstrate the manner in which this "basic norm" has been prescribed and
applied. 53 The comedown of Professor Mooney's critique, however, is
that he says little more. One longs for incisive comment on a number
of critical points: Professor Falk's failure to supply meaningful empirical guidelines by which domestic courts can make the requisite
initial determination of whether "legitimate diversity" exists or not; the
theoretical inconsistency between his approval of substantive competence only in cases governed by universally accepted principlesan essentially rule-oriented theory-and his major contention that substantive competence should be allocated according to prevailing control and reciprocity patterns-basically a policy-oriented theory; his
policy blurring and positivistic advocacy of "quasi-jurisdictional"
euphemisms rather than contextual criteria as agents for guarding
against parochialism in given cases; the fallacy of his assuming that
domestic courts will be less immune from political bias and expediency than executive and legislative decision-making organs; his
seeming inability to recognize that the tendency of domestic courts "to
invoke norms that correspond with the national preference" is not
necessarily destructive of the international legal order but merely
reflective of the vast process of claim and counterclaim by which, indeed, that order is established; the apparent anomaly in his conviction
that domestic courts should respect international law, on the one hand,
and his conclusion that they should ignore certain claimed violations
thereof, on the other; and so forth. To the extent that Professor
Mooney touched on any of these issues, he did so only cursorily. He
could have added immeasurably to this complex subject, however, if
he had written (at least in part) "The Role of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order-A Reply."
A third ground for criticism is Professor Mooney's failure to treat
more conclusively the "political questions" theory which seemed to
underlie the Court's construction of the Act of State Doctrine. It is sub51

Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 39

IND. L.J. 429, 448-44 (1964), quoted in part in MooNEY at 127 n.48.
52 MOON-E 127.
53

See MooNEY 127-32.
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mitted that he could have demonstrated that Sabbatino failed even to
follow this theory as it has been traditionally understood and applied.
A starting- or ending-point could have been the famous case of Baker v.
Car- 4 in which the "political questions" doctrine was recently clarified.
Following a brief survey of past trends on the subject, Mr. Justice
Brennan concluded, for the majority, that one or more of the following
"elements" must be present if there is to be dismissal for non-justiciability pursuant to the "political questions" theme: 55
1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinatepolitical department;
[As noted, Professor Mooney comments at some length on
this point. A "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" of foreign seizure issues is not only nonexistent, but is
repudiated, he infers, by the explicit constitutional allocation
of the foreign affairs power among the several branches of our
government, including the Judiciary. The history of foreign
seizure cases in American courts is alone ample evidence. At
best, such issues must rely on "constitutional underpinnings."]
2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it;
[Professor Mooney broaches this also. As indicated, it constitutes a basic part of Sabbatino's ratio decidendi. The Court's
assumptions, however, were unwarranted in the extreme.
Without relying on Professor Mooney's limited documentation, one must admit that there is in the foreign seizure field
both a plethora of "discoverable" standards and an abundance
of agreement about them, among capitalist and non-capitlist
societies alike. The difficulties that arise inhere less in the
standards themselves than in their particular applications. But
then this is normal. To deny their discoverability or manageability in this area, therefore, is but to abdicate commonly accepted judicial functions and to misconstrue the decision process altogther.]
3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judical discretion;
[The only possible issue in Sabbatino which might have relevance here concerns the so-called Bernstein letter-an official and explicit policy declaration by the Department of
State to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that it
54 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
GGSee id. at 217. (Italicization of the "elements", following, is mine.]

KNTUO= LAW

JouNALV

[Vol. 55,

would not object to that court's reversing a prior position by
asserting substantive competence over the legality of a Nazi
seizure. 56 Applying this to the question at hand, one might
argue-as was done in Sabbatino-that the Judicary is prohibited from engaging in substantive review unless and until
the Executive has determined that such review is permissible. The difficulty with this proposition, as Professor Mooney
observes, is that it has never before been invoked in a case
involving a claimed violation of international law and that it
has never been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Moreover,
the "Bernstein letter" was issued in order to bring judicial
policy into line with official national policy; the "Bernstein
exception" has never been demanded in cases where, as was
clearly true of Sabbatino in the lower courts, these respective
policies have been at one-which is to say that foreign seizure
issues do not in and of themselves demand "non-judicial discretion." In sum, there is little or no authority for saying that
the "Bernstein exception" requires an "initial policy determination" without which decision is impossible, a conclusion which
is lent credence by the fact that while it did not disapprove
the "Bernsteinexception" neither did the Sabbatino Court approve it.]
4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government;
[Arguably, if the State Department were to issue a "Bernstein
letter," judicial disregard thereof would likely constitute the
kind of disrespect of which Mr. Justice Brennan was speaking. Bearing in mind the "elements" following, this appears
to be the only way in which such disrespect could have been
manifested in Sabbatino. There having been no "Bernstein
letter," however, the question turns on whether the State
Department's Supreme Court brief and argument on the side
of judicial non-review constituted a functional equivalent.
The majority seems to have so concluded.5 7 But Professor
Mooney's contrary assessment, virtually identical to that of
Mr. Justice White's dissent, is the more persuasive. Prior to
this particular interposition (even while Sabbatino was in the
56 See note 17 supra.
57
Clarity was not one of the majority's virtues on this matter. The extent to
which the State Departments presence in the case may have influenced its outcome is therefore open to conjecture. Professor Mooney believes, however, that it
may have been "actually determinative." See MooNE 73.
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lower courts), the State Department was officially and publically on record as being opposed to the Cuban seizure in
question on the ground that it was violative of international
law. In its brief, the Government disclaimed any interest in
the substantive outcome of the case. And at no time did it say
that adjudication would impede its functions; it sought only
to establish a general principle of judicial non-review. Under
these circumstances, it is hard to see how substantive review
could have been in any way deemed disrespectful.] 5
5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to political decision
already made;
[Of all the "elements," this is the most clearly inapposite.
As noted, no "Bernstein letter" was ever issued. If, however,
we are to assume that the State Department's perplexing decision to interpose was of the kind contemplated here, then one
must also consider the Department's prior decision publicly
to denounce the Cuban seizure involved. In these contradictory lights, it seems obvious that not even the Executive saw
"an unusual need for unquestioning adherence." If anything,
indeed, there was an "unusual need" to adhere to "political"
decisions made by the Continental Congress in 1788.]
6) the potentiality of embarrassmentfrom multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
[As Professor Mooney makes clear, the possibility of embarrassing the Executive greatly concerned the majority. But he
does not ask whether the Court's concern was warranted.
Analysis suggests not. We must recognize, preliminarily, that
while judicial abstention may avoid Executive embarrassment
in some cases, it may not in others. In the well-known
Bernstein Affair, for example, it was judicial abstention that
proved ultimately embarrasing to national policy, not judicial
review. In any event, how substantive review could have embarrassed the Executive in Sabbatino is difficult to fathom. As
Professor Mooney recounts, the State Department had already
publicly censured the Cuban seizure in question and the
United States had already severed diplomatic relations with
Cuba by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. Of
58 This view is given strength by the fact that when the Sabbatino case was
on remand to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, after passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment, the State Department
contemplated no 'determination" pursuant to the Hickenlooper Amendment to
request the court to abstain from review in the interest of United States foreign
policy. See MooNEv 123.
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course, it is always possible that the judiciary may properly
validate or invalidate a foreign act which some other branch
may improperly condemn or praise, respectively. But then is
it correct to assume that domestic courts should automatically
be forestalled from bringing national policy into line with
the requirements of international law-to assume, that is, that
the political branches may disregard international law with
impunity? In other words, this may be the kind of embarrassment which, in the interest of a world rule of law, sometimes should be suffered. On the other hand, it is equally
possible that the courts may improperly validate or invalidate
a foreign act. Then, however, it is properly the Judiciary and
not the Executive who should be embarrassed.]
The point is, in sum, that none of the "elements" contained in the
Baker case were, to use Mr. Justice Brennan's word, "inextricable"
from Sabbatino. And even if one could claim, contrary to Baker, that
the list is not exhaustive, considerable deference would have to be
paid Mr. Justice Brennan's warning that "[t]he political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of governmental order, will not be
so applied as to promote only disorder."5 9 The Sabbatino Court overlooked this warning, however. Improperly invoking the "political
question doctrine" by tautologically assuming, in essence, that an issue
is a "political question" if it concerns the conduct of foregn affairs, it
substantially foreclosed the American judiciary from any significant
role in the international decision process, thereby misconstrued the Act
of State Doctrine and, so, promoted only disorder. Professor Mooney's
failure to entertain these and related considerations leaves one, therefore, with a sense of disappointment, and all the more so because of
his enlightened point of view overall.
A fourth and final criticism differs from the three preceding in
that it concerns a sin more of commission than omission. In his commendable endeavor to distinguish Sabbatino from past foreign seizure
cases, Professor Mooney several times makes statements to the effect
that Sabbatino involved a clear violation of interiational law.60 One
statement suggests that he intends these to mean only-and more
precisely-that Sabbatino, unlike its "precedents," involved a claimed
6590

369 U.S. at 215.

E.g., Moo.EY 74: "None of these early [Act of State] cases involved
[like Sabbatino] foreign seizures in violation of international law... ;" MooNMs
76: "Throughout their long histories no case in the Supreme Court clearly presented [like Sabbatino] an instance of a foreign seizure in violation of international

law."
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violation of international law. 1 His perspective is by no means selfevident, however. If he is saying that Sabbatino involved a claimed
violation, then, to be sure, he can be chastised only for creating an
unnecessary ambiguity. But if he is saying that the case involved a
clear violation of international law, he is open to criticism of a much
harsher kind. For nowhere does he substantiate this assertion, and
one is led inevitably to question his basis for making the judgment
and, so, his right to make it at all. Is it premised on a comprehensive,
multifactoral assessment of the "Law of State Responsibility"? Is it
based on the findings of three American courts? Or is it the product,
simply, of a natural tendency "to invoke norms that correspond with
the national preference"? If his judgment is based on anything but
the first of these possibilities, then Professor Mooney has committed
an error of the very kind that Professor Falk and the Sabbatino Court
have sought to guard against: he has forgotten to maintain his
impartiality. This, obviously, is no way to answer Sabbatino's defenders. To the contrary, it only strengthens their argument and, so,
does his own cause a great disservice. In other words, if blindly
conventional, arbitrary, and biased judgments are to be avoided-if,
that is, Professor Falk's and the Sabbatino Court's intuitions are to be
disproved-then there is no escaping the deliberate and concededly
sometimes vexdng performance of all the tasks of rational inquiry: the
clarification of goals, the description of past trends in decision, the
analysis of conditions affecting decison, the projecton of future trends,
and the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives-in respect of
all points of disagreement in the particular case. 2 Perhaps Professor
Mooney has done this. But if he has, he does not say so. If he has,
indeed, he might even have told us that Cuba's alleged delinquency
was by no means clear-cut. 63
CONCLUSION

This review ends where it began. Professor Mooney has written a
splendid little book. He has made a convincing, enlightened and, one
61 "The Sabbatino case finally presented to the Supreme Court a fact situation
involving a foreign seizure of American-owned movables alleged to be in violation
of international law ... " Moo=FY 72.
02 For extensive indications of the kind of inquiry that is necessary in this

field, see Weston, Community Regulation of Foreign-Wealth Deprivation: A
Tentative Framework for Inquiry, soon to be published by the Ohio State University Press in EssAYs ON EXPROPRIArON and Weston, InternationalLaw and the
Deprivation of Foreign Wealth: A Framework for Future Inquiry, soon to be
published by Princeton University in ThE FuTuRE
ORDER.

OF THE INTENATIONAL LEGAL

In this connection, see Dawson and Weston, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. Ca. L. REv. 63 (1963).
63
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may hope, lasting contribution to the great debate that has raged so
furiously over the Sabbatino case and its multifarious implications for
the international legal order. Perhaps this plaudit has been forgotten
along the way. Lest a mistaken impression be gotten, however, let it
be understood that the best measure of this reviewer's appreciation for
Professor Mooney's book is not the number nor the sharpness of the
foregoing criticisms, but the amount of attention it has here been given
and deserves. After all, as the formidable Mr. Dooley has said: "Ivrybody is inthrested in what ivrybody else is doin' that's wvrong."6
64

DuNNE, TBE WORLD OF MR. DOOLEY 29 (Filler ed. 1962).
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